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THE ABRAHAM L. POMERANTZ
LECTURE

Don’t Blink
SNAP DECISIONS AND SECURITIES REGULATION
Frank Partnoy†
Modern securities markets move at record speed. Trading
decisions are faster than ever. Average investors can immediately
acquire information. Rapid technologies have benefits, particularly
reduced costs. But fast-moving markets can also be dangerous. Few
people had time to think carefully during the financial crisis of
2008 or the “flash crash” of May 6, 2010, when stocks plunged 5-6
percent in minutes and then rebounded almost as quickly.
This article explores the consequences of this speed for
securities markets. It addresses the extent to which securities
regulation should take into account the pace of decision making. It
discusses recent scholarly research on snap decisions and suggests
legal reforms, some designed to harness the power of quick
decisions and others directed at their dangers. It proposes that
regulators slow down the markets with proposals ranging from the
improbably difficult (steps to respond more deliberately to crises) to
the improbably simple (adding a lunch break to the trading day).

†

George E. Barrett Professor of Law and Finance, University of San Diego
School of Law. I am grateful to Michael Cone and Andrew Mundt for research
assistance, and to Laura Adams, James Fanto, Kent Greenfield, Kristin Johnson, and
Shaun Martin for helpful comments. I also want to thank Elizabeth Alper and the staff
of the Brooklyn Law Review for help throughout the process. Finally, I am grateful to
the Pomerantz family for establishing this lecture series and for including me as one of
its honored presenters.
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INTRODUCTION
This essay addresses snap decisions and securities law,
so it seems appropriate to begin with a story of one lawyer’s
snap reaction to Abraham Pomerantz, the renowned and
respected plaintiffs’ securities litigator who pioneered the use of
derivative suits by shareholders against corporate officials and
whose life and career this lecture series honors.1 I have this story
as double hearsay from Ed Labaton, another well-known
plaintiffs’ lawyer, who heard it during the 1960s when his firm
was four floors below the Pomerantz firm and shared its library.2
It was either a Tuesday or a Thursday, the days on which
motions were heard back then, outside room 506 of the federal
courthouse in Manhattan. Abe Pomerantz and a defense lawyer
from a white-shoe New York law firm had just finished arguing
a motion. Outside the hearing room, in the lingering heat of the
argument, the defense lawyer snapped. He made a nasty
personal attack on Abe, calling him, among other things, a
“strike-suit lawyer.” Abe didn’t take insults quietly, so he got in
the other lawyer’s face, pointed his finger, and exclaimed, “I’ll
see to it that I never sue one of your clients again.”
If that lawyer had paused for a moment to think about
why he was able to make a living as a securities defense
lawyer, he might have held his tongue. In this piece, I argue
that the same kind of pause that might have helped this lawyer
also might be good policy in the securities markets. Indeed, I
intend to show that much of the wisdom of securities regulation
is directed at limiting or lengthening snap decisions by market
participants. I also suggest that the study of time and timing
might be a fruitful area of exploration for securities-law
scholars and that notions of delay should play a more
prominent role in the study of markets and corporate and
securities law, and in policy.
In some areas of corporate and securities regulation, the
law introduces delay and probably gets it about right. There is
a waiting period before registration of securities for an initial
public offering, and it is illegal to sell securities during that

1

The Pomerantz Lecture honors the life and work of Abraham L.
Pomerantz, a 1924 graduate of Brooklyn Law School. The lecture series focuses on
topics of corporate securities law and related issues of professional responsibility. The
law firm of Pomerantz Haudek Grossman & Gross LLP, of which Abraham Pomerantz
was the founding partner, provides continuing support for this series.
2
Correspondence with Edward Labaton (Feb. 26, 2011) (on file with author).
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period.3 There is a review and comment process with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for registration
statements.4 Private placements are exempt and consequently
can be created and sold much more quickly.5 (It is worth noting
that the bulk of troubled assets sold during the financial crisis,
including collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), fell within the
private-placement exemption.6) Resales by security holders are
restricted by Rule 144—no resale for a year.7 Proxy regulation
delays voting for up to a year.8 Various provisions of the Williams
Act delay tender offers.9 There are delays related to gun jumping,
Hart-Scott-Rodino, and other regulatory review processes.10
Section 16(b) has a six-month disgorgement rule.11 Various
securities filings are delayed to limited extents, including insider
ownership forms and Schedules 13D and 13F.12 Short-term
3

JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES
MATERIALS 165 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 11th ed. 2009) (There is an average of
two to three months of work that must be accomplished before the registration
statement can be filed.).
4
Id. (The period before the Commission finally issues its letter of comments
can vary greatly. The current SEC policy calls for thirty days but it can take up to one
hundred days. It often takes longer at the end of the calendar quarter or in March for
financial statement filings.)
5
Id. at 74 (Private placements do not require a registration statement and
the purchasers are often sophisticated and can be reached quickly and personally.).
6
Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at SEC Open
Meeting, Washington, D.C.: Addressing the Information Asymmetry in the Securitization
Market to Put Investors and the Economy on Safer Footing (Apr. 7, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch040710laa.htm (“[M]any have concluded that a
contributing factor to the crisis was a lack of disclosure about, and understanding of,
asset-backed securities—including CDOs—offered in private placements.”).
7
COFFEE & SALE, supra note 3, at 531; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2010)
(Qualified institutional buyers (QIB) may purchase a restricted security, but that QIB
still may not resell it to a non-qualified purchaser until after one year has passed.)
8
Tom Burnett, The Key Points to Look for in a Corporate Proxy Statement, AM.
ASS’N OF INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS J., Feb. 2001, at 8, available at http://www.aaii.com/
journal/article/the-key-points-to-look-for-in-a-corporate-proxy-statement (“All publicly
traded companies—with the exception of the tiny ones that are listed on the Nasdaq
Bulletin Board—must file a proxy statement once a year in advance of their annual
meeting”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78n(c) (2006) (prior to the annual meeting, even if no proxy
solicitation is made, the issuer must still file with the Commission and transmit to all
holders information equivalent to that found in the proxy).
9
COFFEE & SALE, supra note 3, at 726-29. Shareholders can withdraw their
tendered shares from seven days until sixty days after commencement. Other
provisions also reduce the pressure to tender.
10
E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77e (It is illegal to sell or offer to buy securities before a
registration statement has been filed.); id. § 18a (This latter code section requires a
filing and waiting period before any person that doesn’t meet an exception may acquire
voting shares.)
11
Id. § 78p.
12
Id. § 78m (Schedule 13D is ten days and Schedule 13F is forty-five days);
see also Schedule 13D, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/
answers/sched13.htm (last visited July 30, 2011); Form 13F—Reports Filed by
AND
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capital gains are taxed at higher rates than long-term gains.13
Even the most ardent supporters of market efficiency use oneday, or even multiday, event studies, rather than instantaneous
analyses of price changes, to assess loss causation and damages
in securities litigation.14 Deal litigation is fast-paced and frenetic,
but deal-protection devices create time for directors, lawyers, and
judges to consider mergers more carefully.15 All these provisions
illustrate an unspoken, yet overarching, objective of corporate
and securities law—to slow us down.
Conversely, consider the dangers when regulators or
legal rules favor a quick response. Critics of the government’s
response to the financial crisis, including Sheila Bair, former
head of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
have noted that panic and quick reactions led to poor decisions,
particularly in the rescue of Bear Stearns, AIG, and other
banks (and in the opposite failure to anticipate the complex
fallout from the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy).16 The public,
and relatedly legislators, tend to react quickly and negatively
to short sellers, even though short selling played a valuable
and important role in uncovering and publicizing financial
misstatements at various financial institutions, as well as
Enron.17 Many critics claim corporate officers and directors are
increasingly focused on short-term share price maximization
instead of long-term sustainable profits.18 Financial reporting is

Institutional Investment Managers, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/form13f.htm (last visited July 30, 2011).
13
IVO WELCH, CORPORATE FINANCE: AN INTRODUCTION 322 (Donna Battista
ed., 2009).
14
Frank Torchio, Proper Event Study Analysis in Securities Litigation, 35 J.
CORP. L. 159 (2009) (Frank Torchio is president of Forensic Economics, Inc., and
teaches finance and economics at the William E. Simon Graduate School of Business
Administration at the University of Rochester. His article is referenced here to
showcase the prevalence of event studies in today’s market.). For a general synopsis of
event studies, see ALAN PALMITER & FRANK PARTNOY, CORPORATIONS: A
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 91 (2010).
15
See PALMITER & PARTNOY, supra note 14, at 959-60.
16
See generally Joe Nocera, Sheila Bair’s Bank Shot, N.Y. TIMES, July 9,
2011, (Magazine), at MM24, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/10/
magazine/sheila-bairs-exit-interview.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&ref=magazine; Sheila
C. Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Remarks to the National Press Club (June
24, 2011), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chairman/spjun2411.html.
17
See FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK
CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 406, 408 (2003).
18
ASPEN INST. BUS. & SOC’Y PROGRAM, OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A CALL
FOR A MORE RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 2
(2009), available at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/images/
Overcoming%20Short-termism%20AspenCVSG%2015dec09.pdf (Focusing on short-term
stock performance instead of long-term maximization of profits can increase transaction
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done on a quarterly basis even though most investors have
much longer time horizons. Executive compensation is also
relatively short term. Even annual bonuses create an incentive
mismatch when the risks associated with employee action are
borne over longer periods. These issues have become especially
challenging in recent years, given the crush of technology, the
press of constant e-mail, the temptations of the Internet, and
the resulting focus on the short term.
In this article, I argue that regulation often takes, or
should take, the approach of encouraging or ordering delay, of
saying “Don’t Blink.” There are two senses in which I mean
“Don’t Blink.” One is about keeping our eyes wide open and
looking closely so we don’t miss something important. The
other is about the dangers of making snap decisions, as fast as
the blink of an eye. My goal in exploring these two ideas is to
encourage scholars to examine the role of delay in financialmarket decision making, and to explore the intersection of
decision making and time management, so we can better
understand the benefits associated with waiting and the art
and science of delay.
This article will focus on two prominent examples in
which timing posed particularly important policy challenges:
the financial crisis of 2008 and the flash crash of May 6, 2010.
Part I describes the financial crisis, comparing the ways in
which Goldman Sachs and Citigroup handled the situation and
analyzing the government’s decision not to save Lehman
Brothers. Part II discusses the flash crash, documenting the
concerns with high-frequency trading and proposing
implementation of circuit breakers and lunch breaks.

costs, encourage dangerous risk-taking, and put stakeholder’s long-term investments in
jeopardy.)
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THE FINANCIAL CRISIS

I begin my discussion of the financial crisis with a story
about Lehman Brothers and the book Blink, and an
introduction to the notions of snap decisions and delay in the
financial markets. Next, I compare the way Goldman Sachs
dealt with the financial crisis with the approach taken by
Citigroup, and I analyze the companies’ procedures through the
lens of the first sense of “Don’t Blink”—staying focused on what
is important. Finally, I describe the weekend government
meeting that determined the fate of Lehman Brothers and
show how this approach comports with the second sense of
“Don’t Blink”—making a quick decision.
A.

Lehman Brothers and Blink

Several months after September 2008—the time most
people think of as the peak of the recent financial crisis—there
were reports that Lehman Brothers, the investment bank that
filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, and thereby
triggered a credit freeze,19 had assigned Blink as part of its
training program for top executives. Lehman had invited
Malcolm Gladwell, the author of Blink, to speak to the firm’s
elite group of future leaders.20
Blink, a bestselling book from 2005, proposed that we
should focus on the first two seconds of our decisions.21 Gladwell
called on readers to “acknowledge there can be as much value
in the blink of an eye as in months of rational analysis.”22
Although the later parts of Blink also explored some of the
dangers associated with biases in decision making,23 the media
and the public received the book primarily as a justification for
intuition and snap decisions.
Before September 15, 2008, my personal views were
decidedly pro-Blink and anti-Lehman. I greatly admired
Gladwell, and I had publicly excoriated Lehman. In fact, on
19

See David Goldman, Credit Freeze: What Lehman Wrought, CNNMONEY
(Nov. 16, 2008, 7:24 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2008/11/14/news/economy/two_months_
since_lehman/index.htm.
20
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL
STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND THEMSELVES
120 (2009).
21
MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING
8 (2005).
22
Id. at 17.
23
See, e.g., id. at 252-53.
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September 14, 2008, just hours before Lehman’s bankruptcy, I
published an opinion piece in the Financial Times entitled
“Hubris—is thy name Richard Fuld?”24 My basic take on these
topics was: Blink good; Lehman bad.
So my initial reaction when I heard about Lehman’s
Blink reading assignment—my snap response, in fact—was that
Lehman officials must have overreacted to the book’s praise for
quick reactions. The last thing Richard Fuld, the head of
Lehman, and his fellow managing directors needed was The
Power of Thinking Without Thinking, which is the subtitle to
Blink. Indeed, the media portrayed this incident as an example
of the folly of Lehman’s obsessively short-term focus, and several
journalists pointed to Joseph Gregory, Lehman’s former
president, as the architect of the firm’s speedy mindset.25
As academics, we have two main weapons: a skepticism
about received wisdom and a lot of time on our hands. So I
explored the details of this anecdote about Lehman and Blink with
the hope that I might learn something about Lehman’s culture.
My interviews and research revealed two interesting things.26
First, Lehman’s leadership program did not embrace
snap decision making; instead, it did the opposite, stressing the
dangers of snap decisions. Joseph Gregory and other senior
managers at Lehman created a cutting-edge, intellectually
rigorous training program, taught by leading social science
scholars. The substance of the program was highly skeptical of
intuition and snap decisions. Lehman even paid to develop a
customized Implicit Association Test, or IAT, to demonstrate to
its own officials how they were biased regarding race, age,
gender, and politics. The program’s participants and content
were diverse along just about every axis.
Malcolm Gladwell’s talk was at the end of the program,
a capstone designed to get managing directors from around the
world together to discuss the firm’s global approach to decision
making. But the folks at Lehman didn’t study a caricature of
Blink. They read and studied the whole book, including chapter

24

Frank Partnoy, Hubris—Is Thy Name Richard Fuld?, FT.COM (Sept. 14, 2008, 8:04
PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6168c7f6-828e-11dd-a019-000077b07658.html#axzz1RvYple00.
25
Gregory was terminated in June 2008, months before the firm’s
bankruptcy. See Ben White, Lehman Chief Accepts Blame for $2.8bn Loss, FT.COM
(June 16, 2008, 9:46 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/50a84d4c-3b99-11dd-9cb20000779fd2ac.html#axzz1MpxRSu65.
26
During 2011, I interviewed and corresponded with several former Lehman
employees, who wished to remain anonymous.
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6 covering the Bronx police shooting Amadou Diallo and the
concluding chapter on gender bias in music auditions.
And yet Lehman’s employees made colossally bad
decisions. They took on too much subprime mortgage risk.27
They hid liabilities from shareholders.28 They made these bad
decisions over months and years, and their elite senior
leadership did not spot or correct them.
Some scholars have argued that the popular
interpretation of Blink’s thesis was oversimplified and
incorrect.29 Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner criticized
Blink’s assumptions and opined that the book was filled with
attenuated anecdotes, poor analyses, and overreaching
assumptions.30 More recently, social science researchers published
empirical work that demonstrates the dangers associated with
snap decisions.31 This literature shows that two seconds is rarely
the optimal amount of time in which to make a decision.32
Even for what we call snap decisions, people frequently
benefit from waiting at least several seconds, up to a minute or
so. Some critics argue that analysis trumps intuition for most
decisions and suggest that even snap decisions are the result of
longer-term analysis.33 Within particular time frames, ranging
from a split second to years, people are often better off making
decisions at the end of the relevant time period—at the very
last possible instant. Although this kind of delayed action is
27

See, e.g., Peter Robison & Yalman Onaran, Fuld’s Subprime Bets Fueled
Profit, Undermined Lehman, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 15, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aiETiKXNbDVE.
28
Fraud allegations were raised against Lehman and its accounting firm
Ernst & Young. See Going for the Auditors: The Ultimate Target of the Lawsuit May Be
Lehman’s Former Bosses, ECONOMIST (Dec. 29, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/
17800083?story_id=17800083.
29
See, e.g., Big Think Interview with Christopher Chabris, BIG THINK,
http://bigthink.com/ideas/20582 (last visited July 30, 2011) (“We are, in a way, taking
on the impression that a lot of people have from books like, ‘Blink,’ by Malcolm
Gladwell, and others in that category, which is sort of an uncritical belief in the power
of intuition and snap judgments and so on, and the idea that you should rely on them
whenever possible.”).
30
See Richard A. Posner, Blinkered, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 24, 2005),
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/posner012405.
31
See generally CHRISTOPHER CHABRIS & DANIEL SIMONS, THE INVISIBLE
GORILLA: AND OTHER WAYS OUR INTUITIONS DECEIVE US (2010); STEVEN JOHNSON,
WHERE GOOD IDEAS COME FROM: THE NATURAL HISTORY OF INNOVATION (2010).
32
See, e.g., Dana R. Carney, C. Randall Colvin & Judith A. Hall, A Thin Slice
Perspective on the Accuracy of First Impressions, 41 J. RES. PERSONALITY 1054 (2007)
(studies showing accuracy frequently increasing with response times of greater than
two seconds).
33
See MICHAEL R. LEGAULT, THINK: WHY CRUCIAL DECISIONS CAN’T BE
MADE IN THE BLINK OF AN EYE 10 (2006).
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often labeled procrastination, it is really more a form of delay
management, a process of understanding when to go fast and
when to go slow.34
Is it possible to generalize from this new perspective on
Lehman and Blink to gain any insight into the causes of and
response to the crisis? One way to assess the importance of
relying on longer-term analysis versus short-term intuition is
to compare two institutions that arguably were at opposite
poles of the financial crisis: Goldman Sachs and Citigroup.
B.

Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, and the Gorilla: The First
Sense of “Don’t Blink”

There are many versions of why the financial crisis
occurred, but they often boil down to the following condition: “If
you had only taken a step back and thought this through . . . .”
For example, many financial market participants—bankers,
investors, and regulators—relied on credit rating agencies and
mathematical models for analytical shortcuts that were
woefully inaccurate and inadequate. They used ratings and
math as mnemonic devices to streamline a massive flow of
information into something they could understand.35 Then they
decided that, if this complex structured instrument is rated
triple-A, or even higher than triple-A, it must be low risk.36
Consider this sentence: if a Monte Carlo simulation
based on historical correlation assumptions predicts that the
probability of subprime mortgage defaults rising to a level that
would impair a super senior tranche of a synthetic
collateralized debt obligation is sufficiently small that the
tranche is virtually risk free, then we can hold tens of billions
34

Professor Manuel Utset has suggested that the notion of delay
management can be captured by the mental process of cost-benefit analysis, instead of
intuition: if the cost of acting immediately outweighs the long-term benefits, the person
will act. Manuel A. Utset, Procrastination and the Law, in THE THIEF OF TIME:
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON PROCRASTINATION 253, 253-55 (Chrisoula Andreou & Mark
D. White eds., 2010).
35
See, e.g., Why Economists Failed to Predict the Financial Crisis,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON: F IN. & INVESTMENT (May 13, 2009), http://knowledge.
wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2234.
36
When the realization hit that the CDOs were much riskier than the rating
they carried, the crediting agencies downgraded them and the banks had to change not
only their formulas, but also their balance sheets. Between the third quarter of 2007
and the second quarter of 2008, mortgage securities had been downgraded by $1.9
trillion. See Jon Birger, The Woman Who Called Wall Street’s Meltdown: Star Bank
Analyst Meredith Whitney Says the Economy Is About to Sink Into a Deep Recession,
CNNMONEY (Aug. 6, 2008, 11:57 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2008/08/04/magazines/
fortune/whitney_feature.fortune/index.htm.
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of dollars of that exposure without worry, or indeed without
even disclosing it. One positive result of the financial crisis is
that many more people understand the preceding sentence
than did a few years ago. But not many people took the time to
understand the principles underlying the text of this sentence
or to ask for a detailed analysis of why so many triple-A-rated
synthetic instruments could be created without high-quality
underlying assets.
With that background, it is strange that Goldman Sachs
would emerge as the supposed villain of the financial crisis. By
every account, Goldman engaged in vigorous, deliberative risk
management. Groups of senior managers discussed every
major position. They not only marked positions to market on a
daily basis, but they analyzed worst-case scenarios.37 They
publicly disclosed value-at-risk, or VAR, numbers, but
internally they did not take them on faith.38 They listened to
and learned from their counterparties, particularly hedge
funds, who were betting against mortgages.39 When the ABX
indices of subprime mortgages began declining in 2006,
Goldman’s analysts undertook a detailed internal study and
produced a thorough internal report about the risks in its
mortgage business.40 They studied actual prices, and actual
profits and losses, instead of trusting ratings and models.41 As a
result, in December 2006, Goldman determined that it was too
exposed to subprime mortgages, and it reduced that exposure.42
Goldman has been vilified for how it reduced its
exposure to the mortgage market, particularly for selling
approximately $25 billion of CDOs during the eight months

37

See Joe Nocera, Risk Management, N.Y. TIMES, (Magazine) (Jan. 2, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/magazine/04risk-t.html?pagewanted=print.
38
See Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: The Role of Investment Banks:
Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. 13, 97-98 (2010) [hereinafter
Hearings] (testimony of David L. Sparks and testimony of Craig W. Broderick).
39
Complaint at 5-6, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 10-03229 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
16, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp-pr2010-59.pdf.
40
Hearings, supra note 38, at 95-96 (testimony of David Viniar); see also
Nocera, supra note 37.
41
See Hearings, supra note 38, at 95-96 (testimony of David Viniar); see also
Nocera, supra note 37.
42
See Hearings, supra note 38, at 4 (statement of Sen. Carl Levin, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs); see also Stephen Foley, Goldman
Trims Sub-Prime Risk, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 14, 2007), http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/business/news/goldman-trims-subprime-risk-440134.html.
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after it decided to reduce its positions.43 Goldman paid $550
million to settle SEC allegations that the firm failed to disclose
information about CDO deals it sold to clients.44 But whatever
you might think of Goldman’s behavior, these actions didn’t
cause the financial crisis. Indeed, Goldman was one of a
handful of financial institutions that survived the crisis intact
because it reduced its mortgage exposure in late 2006.
Goldman spotted the eight-hundred-pound gorilla in the
financial markets in late 2006—the huge risk that a housing
price decline would lead to highly correlated system-wide
defaults, which would erode the value of subprime mortgages
and particularly super-senior tranches of synthetic CDOs.
Goldman Sachs avoided the kind of inattentional blindness
that plagued other banks with exposure to these instruments.
Goldman stepped back and questioned its own judgment. Now
consider Citigroup as a counterexample to Goldman.
Citigroup made some of the most egregious mistakes of
any financial institution during the crisis. Its board and
executives made snap judgments based on intuition and
mnemonics and did not undertake more thoughtful analysis. It
lost billions of dollars on super-senior positions.45 Citigroup’s
snap judgments and a failure to step back and think should
have destroyed the firm.
Although the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
report was a trifurcated political mess,46 some of its hearings
provided useful color, particularly about Citigroup. Citigroup’s
directors and officers accepted naïve risk management
perspectives. For example, Robert Rubin, the former Treasury
Secretary, who was paid more than a hundred million dollars
in cash and stock during his eight years at Citigroup, testified
that “I don’t think anybody focused on the CDOs. This was one
business in a vast enterprise, and until the trouble developed,
it wasn’t one that had any particular profile.”47 Rubin said he
relied on Thomas Maheras. He said, “You know, Tom Maheras
was in charge of trading. Tom was an extremely well regarded
43

FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT:
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 236 (2011) [hereinafter FCIC REPORT].
44
Id. at 193.
45
See Frank Partnoy, Citigroup Bail-out Is Smart but Not Risk-Free, FT.COM
(Nov. 27, 2008, 7:07 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2975ca48-bc99-11dd-9efc-0000779
fd18c.html#axzz1bisJhX7h.
46
See Frank Partnoy, Washington’s Financial Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,
2011, at WK9.
47
FCIC REPORT, supra note 43, at 262.
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trading figure on the street. . . . And this is what traders do,
they handle these kinds of problems.”48
What about Tom Maheras? Maheras, the co-CEO of
Citigroup’s investment bank, made more than $34 million in
2006 but admitted he spent “less than 1% of his time thinking
about CDOs.”49 Yet another of Citigroup’s managing directors,
Susan Mills, had warned about the deteriorations in Citigroup’s
subprime loan quality in early 2006.50 This was the gorilla:
default rates that were doubling or even tripling, that threatened
Citigroup’s tens of billions of dollars of super senior CDO
positions. Yet the senior managers didn’t see this weakness.
They didn’t have the perspective Goldman did because they
didn’t step back. Instead, they sold more CDOs and retained even
more subprime risk. The Federal Reserve found that Citigroup’s
senior management “did not appropriately consider the potential
balance sheet implications of this strategy.”51
Why didn’t Citigroup see the gorilla? When we are
distracted, we don’t see gorillas. I am using the term “gorilla”
deliberately, to reference the visual awareness experiments at
Harvard conducted by Christopher Chabris and Daniel Simons.
Chabris and Simons showed their subjects a short film
depicting two teams of people, one dressed in white and one in
black, moving around and passing basketballs.52 They asked
their subjects to silently count the number of passes made by
players wearing white shirts.53 Halfway through the video, a
student wearing a full-body gorilla suit walks in, stops in the
middle of the players, thumps her chest, and walks off.54 She
spends nine seconds on screen, about one-sixth of the entire
video.55 Yet when Chabris and Simons queried their subjects
after they watched the video, one-half of people did not notice
the gorilla.56 They had “inattentional blindness.”57 They devoted
their attention to one part of the world, and did not recognize
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the striking events in the other part. Numerous studies have
replicated this result.58
Goldman saw the gorilla; Citigroup did not. Numerous
hedge funds saw the gorilla; regulators did not. The financial
crisis boils down to a simple problem: not enough people saw
the gorilla. This is the first sense of “Don’t Blink”—don’t let
your attention lapse, stay focused on the important matters.
What, if anything, can securities regulation do about this
problem? There are two things, and they are not new. Indeed,
they are the twin pillars of the 1930s securities laws: mandatory
disclosure and ex post anti-fraud enforcement.59 As Enron
illustrated, adequate disclosure does not mean burying opaque
references in footnotes. Enron’s infamous footnote 16, which
purported to disclose some of the firm’s off-balance sheet risks,
set off a few reporters and short sellers, but it didn’t adequately
inform investors of the firm’s risks in a salient way.60 Likewise,
Citigroup’s disclosure of subprime risk was impenetrable, buried
in a web of complex off-balance sheet entities.61
If you want to ensure that people spot the gorilla, you
have to tell them there might be a gorilla. Citigroup could have
made its risks salient to investors and senior managers. If
Citigroup had disclosed worst-case scenarios in its financial
statements—that it would lose tens of billions of dollars if
housing prices declined significantly—surely Bob Rubin and
Tom Maheras would have paid more attention.62
According to Chuck Prince, Citigroup’s CEO, his and the
firm’s decisions should not be criticized in hindsight. He said,
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See id. at 39-40 (citing, among other examples, people who miss safety
infractions right in front of them, high school teachers and administrators who fail to
notice bullying, and fair-minded employers who do not notice discriminatory practices).
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Frank Partnoy & Lynn E. Turner, Bring Transparency to Off-Balance
Sheet Accounting, in MAKE MARKETS BE MARKETS: THE REPORT (2010), available at
http://makemarketsbemarkets.org/report/MakeMarketsBeMarkets.pdf
60
See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG.,
FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS 35-36
(Comm. Print 2002).
61
See RooseveltNYC, Frank Partnoy on Off-Balance Sheet Transactions
(MMBM—Roosevelt Institute), YOUTUBE (Mar. 6, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=xpqYL_xEoVo (last visited July 30, 2011).
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Some have questioned whether the gorilla wasn’t missed, but rather ignored,
largely due to the profitability of the risky investments before the crash. It remains
unclear how many bank executives were consciously aware of their institutions’ risk
exposure but were hubristic about the risk, or whether senior personnel really failed to
understand the key mathematical algorithms. See Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the
Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper’s Guide to the Psychology, Culture and
Ethics of Financial Risk-Taking, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1209, 1221-22 (2011).
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If someone had elevated to my level that we were putting on a $2
trillion balance sheet, $40 billion of triple-A, zero-risk paper, that
would not in any way have excited my attention. It wouldn’t have
been useful for someone to come to me and say, “Now, we have got $2
trillion on the balance sheet of assets. I want to point out to you
there is a one in a billion chance that this $40 billion could go south.”
That would not have been useful information.63

This statement is hard to reconcile with Prince’s 2006
comment: “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things
will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve
got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.”64
What the FCIC investigators should have asked Prince
was this: “What if someone had elevated to your level the risk
that the bank would become insolvent if housing prices
declined 30 percent? Would that have excited your attention?
Would that have been useful information?” Worst-case
scenarios are the gorillas of the financial markets, and they
should be disclosed in far greater detail. Prince’s reference to
“complicated” in his “music” quote suggests that he was aware,
at least in part, of these risks. In any event, even if the
awareness was buried at a lower level within the bank, there
should have been a mechanism that led to its disclosure.
Unfortunately, the Dodd-Frank Act and other reforms
do not require disclosure of these kinds of facts, either to the
public or to regulators. Some companies try to do this privately
through risk management,65 emulating Goldman Sachs. But
securities regulation reform could help encourage managers
and shareholders to engage in more long-term analysis than
short-term intuition by requiring more robust and salient
disclosure of worst-case scenarios.
The second pillar—antifraud—is also relevant. If the
directors and officers of Citigroup are not held responsible for
failures to disclose gorillas, why would they disclose gorillas?
Yet private rights of action by shareholders have been
substantially restricted in recent years,66 and government
prosecutions have not filled the gap. The early shareholder
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FCIC REPORT, supra note 43, at 260.
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derivative litigation against Citigroup was dismissed;67 it
remains to be seen whether federal class actions against
Citigroup, and other financial institutions, will fare better.68 As
of late 2011, there had been no major criminal cases against
individual Wall Street employees.
Last year, the SEC civilly charged Citigroup with
repeatedly making misleading statements about its exposure to
subprime-mortgage-related assets. According to the SEC,
“Between July and mid-October 2007, Citigroup represented
that subprime exposure in its investment banking unit was $13
billion or less, when in fact it was more than $50 billion.”69 For
that epic fraud, Citigroup paid a $75 million penalty.70 Its
former chief financial officer Gary Crittenden agreed to pay
$100,000, and former head of investor relations Arthur
Tildesley, Jr., agreed to pay $80,000.71 These numbers are
obviously inadequate to deter financial fraud. If Citigroup and
its executives had known these would be the penalties in
advance, they would not have had any economic incentive to
behave differently. A short-term-focused illegal decision is
more profitable than a long-term-focused legal one.
Another useful policy tool would encourage market
participants to rely, as Goldman did, on market measures of
risk instead of ratings and financial models. The Dodd-Frank
Act requires the elimination of regulatory references to ratings,
and that important project is in progress.72 The SEC has
proposed rules for Forms S-3 and F-3 filings and related
documents, based on the presence of a deep market for such
seasoned issues,73 but there is some reluctance to substitute
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market-based measures of credit risk for ratings in regulation.74
International regulators continue to rely on ratings.75 The
future of ratings in regulation remains unclear.
A market-based approach would improve risk-related
incentives at financial institutions. Consider how much more
difficult it would have been for Citigroup’s CDO desk to take on
large amounts of subprime risk in 2006 if—instead of reporting
internally that the risk was triple-A, or better than triple-A, or
that the probability of loss was one in a trillion according to the
model—it had reported the market price of the risk and noted
that the price had increased from ten to thirty basis points.
Based on its valuation model in late August 2006, Citigroup
reported that losses on its super senior tranches might range
from $15 million to $2 billion.76 Yet market prices, as reflected in
credit default swaps, had already plummeted by that time.
Markets are not always correct, of course, but market measures
of risk can provide an early warning detector, a gut check, to help
people avoid using their gut reactions in the wrong way. That is
one reason why Goldman decided to reduce its exposure in
December 2006, nearly two years before Lehman’s bankruptcy.
Investment decisions based on ratings might not seem
like high-speed snap decisions. But they are decisions that are
made quickly in a relative sense. If people are accustomed to
equating triple-A ratings with safety, then when they see
triple-A, they will anchor around the idea that the triple-Arated instrument is safe. Most of the decision about safety and
risk is made immediately, at a pre-conscious level. Hopefully,
the snap reaction that people have today to the triple-A symbol
is dramatically more skeptical than the snap reaction people
had a few years ago.
C.

Lehman’s Bankruptcy and a Weekend at the Federal
Reserve: The Second Sense of “Don’t Blink”

A different financial crisis decision was “Don’t Blink”like in the second sense I’m discussing, in that the decision was
made too quickly. This is the decision, not by Lehman’s traders
about the bank, but about Lehman by its regulators. On
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See Yali N’Diaye, US SEC to Address Reliance on Credit Ratings Yet
Again, MARKET NEWS INT’L (Apr. 25, 2011, 2:49 PM) (on file with author).
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September 10, 2008, the “[Federal Reserve Bank of New York]
staff put together a draft gameplan for a ‘liquidity consortium’
of major Wall Street banks to provide a forum where these
firms can explore possibilities of joint funding mechanisms to
avert Lehman’s insolvency.”77 But the gameplan provided that
“[c]onsortium members would be given ‘[v]ery little advance’
notice, ‘2 hours max,’ in order to ‘minimize the risk of outside
leaks.’”78 Then, the consortium banks would have only the
weekend—no longer—to perform due diligence on Lehman. If
no plan emerged, the Federal Reserve officials would “reach out
to regulators in DC and abroad to inform them of potential
market disruptions at the opening of business on Monday.”79
On Friday night, September 12, 2008, twelve
investment bank CEOs were summoned to the Federal
Reserve’s headquarters at 33 Liberty Street in New York.80
Over the weekend, they agreed to provide $20 billion to support
a purchase of Lehman by Barclays Capital.81 But it was a deal
that was doomed to fail—or at least doomed to fail by Monday.
Barclays executives were not invited to the consortium
meeting; they were separately conducting due diligence that
night and over the weekend to decide whether to acquire
Lehman.82 Barclays made it clear that in order to guarantee
Lehman’s financial obligations, a requirement of any deal, it
would need shareholder approval, something that could not
happen before Monday.83 When British regulators confirmed
that this requirement would hold, the deal fell through, and
Lehman filed for bankruptcy on Monday.84
We can never know what might have happened if the
government had waited a bit longer. Yes, the credit markets were
tight during mid-September 2008. But interest rates were still
relatively low. LIBOR was below five percent.85 Would some
parties have been willing to provide short-term loans at higher
77

Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner at 1517, In re Lehman Bros.
Holdings, Inc., 433 B.R. 113 (2010) (quoting FRBNY, Liquidity Consortium (Sept. 10,
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rates, or would the markets really have frozen? It is very possible.
But regulators could step back and think about these possibilities.
That weekend, they were trapped by a snap decision.
Although commentators disagree about a wide range of
issues related to the collapse of Lehman, it is undeniable that
the decisions about whether to rescue Lehman were made
quickly, perhaps more quickly than any financial regulatory
decisions in history. The overwhelming pressures from
technology—e-mail, the web, computing power, smart phones—
sped up the pace of responses. Regulators struggled to avoid
the crush of this time pressure.
It is ironic that government officials, who so often are
thought to act too slowly, should have acted so quickly under
time pressure during the financial crisis. The problem is that
regulators have not considered a challenge for all types of
leaders in the modern technological age: how to manage delay.
Some time-pressured scenarios are unavoidable, but the clear
message of recent research is that they should be avoided
whenever possible and that, to the extent they cannot be
avoided, there should be emergency plans in place so that the
senior regulators are experts, not novices, in crisis situations.
Regulators, like market participants, should consciously
address the art and science of delay.
II.

THE FLASH CRASH

The second “Don’t Blink” topic is the so-called “flash
crash.” First, I describe the events of May 6, 2010, and discuss
the role played by high-frequency trading. Then, I explain that
regulation should frame these issues as part of the second
sense of “Don’t Blink.” Finally, I propose two strategies to
encourage delay: implementation of circuit breakers and the
introduction of a lunch break.
A.

A Thirty-Six Minute Roller Coaster

At 2:32 p.m. on May 6, 2010, an employee of Waddell &
Reed, a mutual fund company headquartered about a mile from
my childhood home in Overland Park, Kansas, clicked start on
a computerized trading software program.86 The firm’s goal was
86

The details about the “flash crash” were reported in U.S. COMMODITY
FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FINDINGS REGARDING THE
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to reduce its exposure to $4.1 billion of stocks it owned by
selling something called “E-Mini” futures contracts.87 The “EMini” is based on the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index of top
stocks, except that it is traded in small amounts (hence,
“Mini”), and it goes through an electronic trading platform
instead of the frenzied “open outcry” method still used for other
futures contracts (hence, “E”). To hedge $4.1 billion of stocks,
Waddell & Reed would need to sell 75,000 E-Mini contracts.88
Instead of having its own employees manually enter
these orders or calling a broker, Waddell & Reed used this
automated computer program.89 Each minute, the program
calculated the number of E-Mini contracts traded during the
previous minute.90 It then automatically sold nine percent of
that number.91 The program was designed to take several
hours, or perhaps even days, to sell 75,000 E-Mini contracts.92
Instead, the program triggered the fastest roller coaster
ride in the history of financial markets. At first, when Waddell
& Reed’s computers started to sell, high-frequency traders,
with their own computer programs, stepped in to buy. The
market was calm and balanced—for about nine minutes.93
But after nine minutes, at 2:41 p.m., high-frequency
traders began selling the contracts they had accumulated in
order to zero-out their positions.94 High-frequency traders do
not typically maintain significant long or short positions for
more than a few minutes.95 During the first minute of their
switching sides, trading volume increased, and Waddell &
Reed’s automated program responded by selling a larger
number of E-Mini contracts.96 Then, in the second minute, more
traders sold, and so did the automated program.97 During the
third and fourth minutes, everyone sold even more, in a kind of
high-speed computerized trading death spiral.98
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By 2:45 p.m., trading volume was exploding, and the EMini futures contract was collapsing.99 Its price had fallen 5
percent in just thirteen minutes.100 The high-frequency
computer programs were a large share of the market at this
time.101 During one fourteen-second period, high-frequency
traders accounted for 27,000 E-Mini contracts, about half of the
total trading volume.102
The decline in the E-Mini contracts instantly spread to
the rest of the market. Some of the contagion was bizarre, even
inexplicable. Some was due to “stub orders” set at absurdly low
prices. Some was due to computer algorithms that hadn’t
anticipated this kind of shock. Many high-frequency traders
exited their positions entirely, running for the virtual hills.
Stock indices other than the E-Mini also collapsed, as did
individual stocks. At 2:47 p.m., shares of Accenture plc, the
consulting firm, fell from nearly $40 to $30, and then
suddenly—in just seven seconds—plummeted to one cent.103 A
few minutes later, shares of Procter & Gamble, the consumer
products company, fell from more than $60 to $40.104 Shares of
blue-chip companies such as IBM, Apple, 3M, and General
Electric also declined abruptly.105
But then, just as fast, the market snapped to life.
Accenture traded near $40 again; Procter & Gamble was back
above $60.106 Within minutes, the E-Mini contract and all these
stocks recovered. By 3:08 p.m., the market settled, and prices
were about the same as they were before Waddell & Reed
started the computer program.107 The program had finished
selling 75,000 E-Mini contracts, and then, by instruction, it
shut down. The entire ride, the bust and boom now known as
the “flash crash,” had taken just thirty-six minutes.
B.

High-Frequency Trading

Many critics have blamed high-frequency traders for the
flash crash. They say high-frequency trading is socially
wasteful and dangerous. Yet there is overwhelming empirical
99
100
101
102
103
104
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evidence showing that under “normal” conditions highfrequency traders constitute a powerful positive force in the
markets. So-called low-latency trading improves traditional
yardsticks for market quality, such as liquidity and short-term
volatility.108 Recent empirical work shows that high-frequency
traders did not trigger the flash crash.109 The trigger was the
computer program at Waddell & Reed.
However, the evidence also shows that during periods of
high market uncertainty—such as May 6, 2010—highfrequency trading is associated with increased volatility.110
High-frequency trading appears to be most dangerous when
new information is entering the market, when it can cause
prices to swing more dramatically.111
High-frequency trading is a dominant force in modern
markets. Estimates suggest that it accounts for almost threequarters of dollar trading volume in the United States.112 As the
SEC has recognized, proprietary high-frequency traders have
largely replaced specialists and market makers in stock
trading.113 High-frequency traders’ strategies vary widely, and
some are more defensible than others.114
High-frequency trading isn’t going away. So what
should be done about it? First, it is worth noting that just as
computers have beaten human beings at chess and on
108
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Jeopardy, it is unlikely that human regulators would have
much of a chance against high-speed computer trading
software. These algorithms move and change too quickly for
regulators to act or react in any meaningful way. By the time
the SEC/CFTC report on the flash crash was published on
September 30, 2010, market participants already had switched
to new strategies. No one would use Waddell & Reed’s trading
program today. The algorithms that worked last month
probably no longer work.
Nevertheless, regulators can try to play the same role
they have played in markets generally, even when they are
outmatched. No one believes that prosecutors can stamp out all
insider trading, but most people still favor some regulatory
efforts to deter insider trading.
Likewise, the government can bring cases against highfrequency traders who violate the law. It is unclear how much
high-frequency trading is illegal.115 It probably isn’t a large
percentage, but it isn’t zero, either. But for these kinds of
illegal, fraudulent, and manipulative activities, there is not a
need for new statutes or regulations. Front running and insider
trading are already illegal under current law.116 If regulators
are unable to bring cases against illegal high-frequency
trading, a new regulatory regime might defer to private rights
of action. If investors are disadvantaged by high-frequency
traders, one way to police the practice would be through a
private attorney-general role. To the extent high-frequency
traders are engaged in manipulative market practices,
regulators should either prosecute that activity or encourage
private actions that deter it.
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Lunch Breaks and Circuit Breakers: The Second Sense
of “Don’t Blink”

The other—and perhaps even more important—policy
for regulators to implement is a “Don’t Blink” strategy. They
should encourage delay. Indeed, regulators should heed one of
the lessons that market participants in the high-frequency
trading area are learning: a crucial element of successful
trading is delay management. For some strategies, it is best to
be first. But for other strategies, it is better to wait a little bit.
There are various catch phrases that describe this, like “the
first-mover disadvantage” or, conversely, “the second-mover
advantage.” Or “the second mouse gets the cheese.” A complete
analysis of this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this article,
so I will simply note that UNX, a high-frequency trading firm,
was ranked as the top execution-only broker in numerous
trading categories from 2005 through mid-2007, and one major
reason for its success was that its trading executive was
slightly delayed, by a few dozen milliseconds.117
Regulators follow the lead of this private market
philosophy and slow down the markets by introducing explicit
pauses. One of this article’s themes is that decision makers
should take time to step back and think. Yet given the speed of
modern markets, there is little time for market participants to
do that. Regulators could create more time with circuit breakers.
Regulators have introduced circuit breakers already to
force markets to shut down when they have declined by certain
specified amounts. After the flash crash, the SEC adopted a pilot
program to introduce a five-minute pause if the price of any
stock in the S&P 500 Index fell by 10 percent or more during a
five-minute period. After the five-minute pause, the primary
listing market would use an auction process to determine the
new opening price.118 In September 2010, the pilot program was
expanded to the Russell 1000 Index and some exchange traded
funds. Trading would halt for five minutes.119 These pauses are a
117
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sensible supplement to the circuit breakers that apply generally
during major market downturns.
But it is also worth asking more generally if markets
would benefit from the introduction of longer pauses, of breaks
during the day designed to encourage thinking and deliberation
before action. When I worked in Morgan Stanley’s Tokyo office
during the 1990s, I was struck by the impact of the ninetyminute lunch break on trading. Not that Morgan Stanley’s
traders were models of propriety during lunch: some of the
most egregious trades described in my book F.I.A.S.C.O. were
created in Tokyo, and were conceived during those breaks.120
Still, as a general matter, Tokyo’s pause in market
trading led to more rational thinking about the trading day and
often helped cooler heads prevail. During the morning’s twohour trading session, traders and salespeople focused on prices
and deals. There was relentless pressure to execute. But then
there was a break from 11:00 a.m. until 12:30 p.m. During that
time, traders, salespeople, and clients had conversations that
actually lasted for more than a few seconds. They pondered
new investment strategies or ideas. They read. Sometimes
during the lunch break they even had lunch. Following this
break, there was another two-and-a-half hour trading session
during the afternoon. The stock exchanges in Hong Kong,
Shenzhen, and Singapore followed a similar approach, with
ninety-minute, mid-day breaks. In contrast, all the world’s
other stock exchanges, including those in the United States,
have been and are still open continuously from the morning
until the closing bell.
Unfortunately, the Asian markets are now moving
toward the Western model. In February 2011, the Tokyo Stock
Exchange announced that it would shorten its lunch break by
thirty minutes beginning in May, shifting the start of lunch
back to 11:30 a.m. from 11:00 a.m.121 Some commentators
criticized the move. One market participant suggested that
extending the time for trading probably would not boost volume
because “trading tends to focus around the beginning and end
audit trail to detect disturbances in the market. See id. at 7, 10; see also Michael Mackenzie &
Telis Demos, Fears Linger of New ‘Flash Crash,’ FT.COM (May 5, 2011, 6:23 PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d18f3d28-7735-11e0-aed6-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1OorJDaYi.
120
See generally FRANK PARTNOY, F.I.A.S.C.O.: BLOOD IN THE WATER ON
WALL STREET (1997).
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Takako Iwatani & Kana Nishizawa, Tokyo Bourse Will Start Shorter Lunch
Break on May 9, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 6, 2011, 11:08 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201102-07/tokyo-bourse-will-start-shorter-lunch-break-on-may-9-tse-says.html.
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of trading sessions.”122 Interestingly, 70 percent of corporate and
individual investors opposed the plan to extend trading hours.123
Yet it passed.
A typical law review article about financial market
regulation might propose an intricate and complex reform of
computer algorithm-driven trading. Instead, let me offer a
more basic reform idea: force traders to break for lunch. I favor
the introduction of a lunch break at the New York Stock
Exchange and NASDAQ.
A lunch break would create a much-needed pause for
reflection and thought during the trading day. Breaks have the
additional benefit of creating another opening time, after
lunch, when prices would be set based on a pool of bids and
offers. At the extreme, the modern trading day might consist
simply of two or three brief auctions, with breaks between
them. Critics will argue that there would be less liquidity
under such a regime, and there very well might. Only an
experiment could answer questions about this concern. But the
benefits of giving market participants more time to engage in
thoughtful discourse and analysis could substantially outweigh
any potential loss of liquidity.
Moreover, it is worth asking how much liquidity is
necessary in today’s securities markets. How often do even the
most active traders need to move in and out of positions at
particular moments during the day? Most high-frequency traders
maintain a flat trading profile, and they zero-out positions right
away, or at the latest by the end of the day. Few fundamental
traders need to move the bulk of their positions at particular
times. And introducing pauses could also deter retail investors
from day trading, which is an addictive (and on balance a
destructive and losing) strategy. Intraday pauses could create
time for people to engage in more productive uses of their time.
Imagine this thought experiment. What if you could
trade in U.S. equities or any financial instrument whose value
is derived from U.S. equities for only one hour in the morning
and one hour in the afternoon? Trades at any other time would
be unenforceable. Any purchases and sales during paused
periods would be void. Or, in a less extreme version, trades
during paused periods could be subject to a transaction tax. Of
course, there would be pressure for trades to occur outside of
122
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this legal framework for so-called regulatory arbitrage. The
policy would require international coordination, but that is
getting easier as the major exchanges merge. What if each of
the major global markets agreed to trade for an hour or two
only, and refused to enforce trades outside those time periods?
Many market participants would complain about a
reduction in liquidity. And perhaps they would be right. But
liquidity at what cost? And why would one conclude that there
would be greater liquidity during a twenty-four hour, constant
international trading day, which is where current trading
trends are headed? There is a strong argument and evidence
that constant trading merely gives the illusion of liquidity.
For example, one lesson from the flash crash is that the
supposed liquidity provided by high-frequency traders and
others can evaporate very quickly. When there is an error—the
next Waddell & Reed program, or the next extra-zero input by a
“fat finger”—it will occur at a random time, when liquidity will
be limited. Wouldn’t it be better for such errors to occur during a
compressed timeframe, when everyone is trading? On a pertrading-moment basis, there arguably should be greater market
depth and liquidity after the timing of trading is restricted.
Indeed, limiting trading hours might be an especially good idea
for less liquid stocks, which would have deeper markets, albeit
for a shorter time. The major disadvantage would be that some
people who want to trade a few hours earlier will not be able to
do so. But who fits within that category?
Interestingly, the SEC/CFTC investigation of the flash
crash indirectly supports this pause idea: “Another key lesson
from May 6 is that many market participants employ their own
versions of a trading pause—either generally or in particular
products—based on different combinations of market signals.”124
The study confirmed that “a liquidity crisis can develop if many
market participants withdraw at the same time.”125 Much good
124

CFTC/SEC FINDINGS, supra note 86, at 6. The SEC and CFTC recommend
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policy comes from market-based insights. If markets are
pausing, shouldn’t regulators?
One final point: although circuit breakers are designed
to kick in only when markets are collapsing, why should they
have effect only in times of downward stress? The dot.com and
housing bubbles are just the latest examples of the dangers
associated with rapid moves up as well as down. Perhaps if
market participants paused when markets surged they might
question more why markets were surging.
CONCLUSION
Delay plays an important, though often hidden, role in
financial markets and financial market regulation. Delay
management can be an important policy tool for regulators.
But rather than conclude by repeating my thoughts about
delay and securities regulation, I want to make the point in a
more oblique way, by explaining briefly how the idea of “Don’t
Blink” applies to the writing of this article.
Professor James Fanto first contacted me about the
Pomerantz lecture during mid-September 2010, and we agreed
on a lecture date of March 15, 2011. That gave me six months
to prepare for the talk. We discussed possible topics, and I
promptly did nothing about the lecture for nearly two months.
The topics went into my deep subconscious, where they
brewed until early November 2010, when I received an e-mail
from Elizabeth Alper of Brooklyn Law School requesting that,
by November 15, I confirm the title and write a brief
description of the topic for publicity materials. The topic
bubbled in my brain for a while. I did some research, and
generally spent more time reading about the financial crisis
and the flash crash. I wrote a paragraph about the talk, and
finally signed off on the description on December 3, 2010, more
than two weeks late. (I don’t want to mention how long I took
to complete speaker permission and expense forms; that is just
too embarrassing.)
I was still nowhere near starting to draft this article,
though I was reading and researching the two topics more, and I
was getting a better idea of what I would cover. I hired two
research assistants to help me gather background materials for
each topic.
Then, after the winter break, on February 9, 2011, Jim
Fanto sent me the following gentle e-mail reminder: “What do
you think? The talk is on Mar. 15. Kristin and Kent are
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expected to give about 5–10 minutes each of comments. Can
you give them something two weeks before? One week before?”
I responded that I would send them something by March 1,
stating that “I’m working on it and will get all of you something
as soon as I can.” I read and researched more, and I thought
more. I began to outline some of my thoughts.
March 1 passed and I still hadn’t begun drafting the
article, though I now had a decent idea of what I planned to say
and I understood the details about the financial crisis and the
flash crash reasonably well. I was scheduled to give a talk to
my law school’s board of visitors on March 4th, so I decided to
discuss the timing of the Pomerantz lecture and how I hadn’t
yet started writing the article in the context of a larger book
project on the role of delay in decision making (which I had also
barely started, and which was due in a few months). Later that
day, Elizabeth Alper sent me a reminder e-mail that the
lecture would be on March 15. Then, I shifted gears and
worked furiously for a week. On March 10, I circulated a draft
of the talk, which I continued to edit during the remaining
days. Jim Fanto, Kent Greenfield, and Kristin Johnson were all
gracious enough not to mention that I had given them only a
few days to prepare a response to my draft (though, in my
defense, they had a general idea of what I would cover well
before that, and I believe they would not have begun preparing
their comments until after March 10 in any event).
Next, immediately after the talk, I met Shawna
MacLeod, the Editor-in-Chief of this law review. A week later,
as promised, she sent me a detailed note about timing, giving
me the choice of sending a first round draft on May 27 or a
final manuscript on July 15. I chose the latter. Then I promptly
did nothing for a month. She sent a follow-up e-mail on June
20, with eight apparently strict deadlines that would follow
soon after I delivered the manuscript.
After the Fourth of July weekend, I finally went through
all the materials my research assistants had gathered, and I
spent the next eleven days finishing the research and writing
of the article. The editorial process then went smoothly, and we
approved the final manuscript on November 11.
I include all of this detail for two reasons. First, I know
from discussions with many other academics that my various
delays, though they might seem like irresponsible
procrastination to people with real-world jobs, actually are
consistent with a common and reasonable approach to
scholarly writing. If I had written this article right away, I
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would have missed many important details, thoughts, and
research. I would not have had the opportunity to let the ideas
brew for several months before putting them down on paper.
Waiting until the last minute isn’t always bad; it is often
precisely what we should be doing: taking as long as we
possibly can to consider a research project and then finishing at
the last possible moment at the highest possible speed.
Second, I want to set forth the details of this account to
remind academics that, although the Internet and the
temptations of publishing in speedier venues are attractive
alternatives to the slower pace of traditional academic articles
and books, there are benefits to longer-form, longer-term
writing that these other media do not have. The academics’
comparative advantage is to take more time, to think through
complex issues more deeply than others. Given the increasing
speed of other approaches to writing, more leisurely-paced
scholarship in academic articles and books is increasingly
important today. That isn’t to say that academics should avoid
writing for other media, but rather that there is a special place
for delayed thinking.
If the snooty lawyer confronting Abe Pomerantz in the
story at the beginning of this article had taken more time to
think, he would not have insulted Abe—he would have thanked
him for suing his clients. Many lawyers, plaintiff- and defenseside alike, make judgments about the other side based on limited
information. We all are prone to biases and cognitive error. But a
fairer, more experienced counsel would have understood that
securities litigation can and often does serve an important social
purpose—deterring the fraudulent conduct that threatens
investors and markets. Or at least he would have understood
that without plaintiffs’ lawyers he would not have a job.
If we learn no other lesson from the recent financial
crisis and the flash crash, hopefully lawyers and regulators—
and academics—will understand that there are dangers
associated with snap decisions, and that we should include
timing and delay among the factors that matter in regulating
financial markets.

